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If more productive rms grow relatively fast, an industry performs bet-
ter, even when no rm exhibits technical or e¢ ciency change. In other
words, the two well-known sources of productivity growthtechnology and
e¢ ciencycan be augmented by a third one, namely the industrial organi-
zation e¤ect. In this paper the e¢ ciency of an industrial organization and
its contribution to performance are measured by benchmarking all rms
on the industry. More precisely, e¢ ciency is measured by the proximity
between a rm and the best practices. Aggregation of rm e¢ ciencies
is imperfect. The bias is used to measure the e¢ ciency of the industrial
organization. In benchmarking, change transmitted by a rm represents
productivity growth and change transmitted by the best practices repre-
sents technical change. Although I use a nonparametric framework, which
requires only input and output information, duality analysis reveals the
Solow residual. In discrete time Malmquist indices capture the measure-
ment of the industrial organization e¤ect, e¢ ciency changes, and technical
change. The industrial organization of Japanese banking is analyzed.
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If relatively productive rms grow relatively fast, an industry will improve its
performance, even when no rm exhibits technical change or e¢ ciency change.
The industrial organization changes for the better and contributes to perfor-
mance. The e¤ect is positive for industries where winners are picked and neg-
ative for industries where losers are protected. In this paper the performance
of an industry is assessed in terms of technology, e¢ ciency, and its industrial
organization. The theory is developed in a nonparametric setting, which merely
requires input and output information. Nonetheless I establish the link with the
Solow residual, which normally requires a production function. In discrete time
I set up the Malmquist variants of technical and e¢ ciency change and capture
the industrial organization e¤ect.
In neoclassical economics, particularly Solovian growth theory (1957), it is
customary to assume perfect competition and no externalities. The economic
equilibrium is e¢ cient and any improvement in output/input ratios can be as-
cribed to technological progress. The assumption of perfect competition is re-
leased in more micro-economic approaches to productivity, ever since Debreus
(1951). His coe¢ cient of resource utilization measures the ine¢ ciency in a static
economy and has been commingled with Solows residual in productivity analy-
ses, particularly Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Analysis.
The insights of Debreu and Solow have been married by showing that produc-
tivity growth encompasses not only technical change, but also e¢ ciency change.
Roughly speaking, an economy may improve its performance by shifting out
its frontier or by approaching it. While this decomposition is crystal clear at
the micro level and has been applied to the macro level (Färe et al., 1994),
Blackorby and Russell (1999) have shown that things do not add up except
under restrictive conditions. Indeeed, aggregating industry productivities to
total productivity growth, Jorgenson, Ho, and Stiroh (2003) capture allocative
e¢ ciency changes in their formula (53). In the present paper I show that the
industrial organization e¤ect reects the bias in the aggregation literature (ten
Raa, 2005) and provide a framework for the measurement of all performance
components: technical change, e¢ ciency change, and industrial organization.
The next section introduces the concept of benchmarking a rm against the
best practices in an industry, by means of a linear program. The same concept
is applied to benchmark the industry against the best practices. Section 3 uses
the aggregation bias to measure the ine¢ ciency of an industrial organization.
Since e¢ ciency is a function of both the object to be benchmarked and the ref-
erence benchmark, time changes may be traced through either argument of the
function. Section 4 shows that the change transmitted through the object itself
is productivity growth and that the change transmitted through the reference
industry is technical change. Productivity growth is thus shown to be the sum
of e¢ ciency change and technical change and discrete time approximations are
presented in section 5, including the industrial organization e¤ect. Section 6
applies the theory to measure the evolution of the industrial organization of
Japanese banking and section 7 concludes.
2
2 Firms and industry e¢ ciency
Denote rm is input vector by xi and its output vector by yi, i = 1; :::; I. Input
and output vectors may have di¤erent dimensions. For example, inputs can be
labor, capital, and land, while outputs may be numerous goods and services.
Some commodities can be both input and output. The industrial organization
is identied with the allocation (xi; yi)i=1;:::;I , which is denoted briey by (x; y).
If I = 1, the industrial organization is a monopoly; if I = 2, it is a duopoly. If
y is a diagonal matrix, we have monopolistic competition. If x is a row vector,
we have an input price taking industry, for which inputs can be aggregated to
cost. The e¢ ciency of a rm is determined by benchmarking rms structure
(xi; yi) against the industrial organization (x; y). This is a comparison between
the actual output level and the best practice output level achievable with the
available input vector. The idea is to reallocate the input, xi, over all the











Here it is assumed that activity (xi; yi) can be run with constant returns to
scale.1 Let "i solve primal program (1).2 The expanded yi="i is the potential
output of rm i, using the best practice technologies. If "i = 0:9, rm i could
produce a factor 1=0:9 = 1: 11 or 11% more. If "i = 1, potential output is no
more than actual output and rm i is said to be fully e¢ cient. In general, "i is
a number between 0 and 1 which indicates the rm e¢ ciency for rm i. The
best practice rms or benchmarks relevant to rm i are signalled by j > 0 in
program (1).
Denote the shadow prices of the constraints in (1) by wi and pi, for the
inputs and outputs, respectively. They solve the dual program:3
min
p;w0
wxi : pyj  wxj ; pyi = 1 (2)
By the main theorem of linear programming the primal and dual programs
have equal solution values:
1="i = wixi (3)
Substituting the price normalization constraint of program (2) in equation
(3), the e¢ ciency of rm i becomes:
"i = piyi=wixi (4)
1Alternatively, one might contract the input. However, under constant returns to scale
output and input based benchmarking are equivalent.
2Notice the program is linear in the nonnegative variables 1="; j .
3The price normalization constraint features no slack, because the non-negativity constraint
for 1=" is non-binding (as 1=" = 1 is feasible by choice of i = 1 and j = 0; j 6= i).
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The e¢ ciency is the ratio of the value of output to the value of input at
internal, rm accounting prices. The prices are rm specic for two reasons:
(i) potential output of rm i has idiosyncratic commodity proportions; (ii) there
are multiple inputs. The rst cause is straightforward. If the output mix of
a rm is relatively intensive in terms of some input, the shadow price of that
input will be high. It follows that rm e¢ ciency is a private measure. The
second cause is deep. If there is essentially one input, as for an industry that
is input price taking, then the shadow prices of the outputs can be shown to be
independent of the rms output mix (the Samuelson substitution theorem, ten
Raa, 1995), ensuring perfect agreement between private and social values.
Shadow input prices are high.4 By the dual constraints in program (2),
no rm makes positive prot at shadow prices. Benchmarks break even (by
the phenomenon of complementary slackness, see ten Raa, 2006) and ine¢ cient
rms incur a loss. This observation conrms that e¢ ciency measure (4) is a
number between 0 and 1.
We now apply the apparatus to the e¢ ciency of the industry. Johansen
(1972) dened potential industry output as a function of total input. Following
Färe and Grosskopfs (2004) extension, the idea is to reallocate the inputs of
all rms, industry input x =
P
xi, as to inate the aggregate, industry output,
y =
P










Let " solve program (5). It is a number between 0 and 1 which indicates
the industry e¢ ciency. The best practice rms or benchmarks relevant to the
industry are signalled by j > 0 in program (5). Denote the shadow prices of the
constraints in program (5) by w and p, for the inputs and outputs, respectively.
They solve the dual program:
min
p;w0
wx : pyj  wxj ; py = 1 (6)
Analogous to equation (3), potential output increases by the following factor:
1=" = wx (7)
Analogous to equation (4), industry e¢ ciency becomes:
" = py=wx (8)
The e¢ ciency is the ratio of the value of output to the value of input. Notice
that the price normalization is a wash, since prices are in the numerator and
the denominator of formula (8).
4This is paradoxal, since the dual program minimizes the value of the inputs. The con-
straint, however, lifts the value of the inputs over the value of the outputs, in fact to the level
of potential output. And the latter is maximized by the primal program.
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3 An industrial organization measure
Proposition 1 establishes a relationship between the e¢ ciency of the industry
and the e¢ ciencies of the rms.
Proposition 1. Industry e¢ ciency is less than the market share weighted
harmonic mean of the rm e¢ ciencies: "  1=
P
si
"i , where s
i = pyi=py are the
market shares evaluated at the prices determined by dual program (6).
Proof. In the dual program (2), consider the socially optimal prices p=pyi
and w=pyi (which need not be privately optimal). The denominator has been
chosen as to full the price normalization constraint in program (2) and the
inequality constraint carries over from program (6). In short, these prices are
feasible with respect to program (2). But by their suboptimality (in this private
minimization program), (w=pyi)xi  wixi or wxi  pyiwixi = pyi="i, using
equation (3). Summing and invoking equation (7) and the price normalization











Corollary 1. If the relative private and social prices are equal, then the
industry e¢ ciency equals the market share weighted harmonic mean of the rm
e¢ ciencies.
Proof. Let the relative private and social prices be equal: wi = iw and
pi = ip. Then in the proof of Proposition 1, p=pyi = pi=piyi = pi and
w=pyi = wi=piyi = wi, by the normalization constraint in program (2). Hence
they are privately optimal and the inequalities in the proof of Proposition 1 are




The reason that industry e¢ ciency is less than mean rm e¢ ciency is that
the industrial organization is suboptimal. It is a form of allocative ine¢ ciency.
Firms better be split or merged, specialize or diversify. The optimal industrial
organization is determined by the benchmarks in program (5). Suboptimality is
signalled by a distortion between private and social prices (Corollary 1). The
e¢ ciency of the industrial organization can thus be measured by the ratio of
the industry e¢ ciency to the mean rm e¢ ciency, or, using Proposition 1:
Denition 1. The e¢ ciency of an industrial organization, (x; y), equals
"IO = "
P
si="i, where si are the market shares evaluated at the prices deter-
mined by dual program (6).
Notice that by Proposition 1 the e¢ ciency of an industrial organization
is indeed a number between 0 and 1, with the latter value representing full
e¢ ciency according to Corollary 1.
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Examples. 1. Consider an industry with equally e¢ cient rms: "i = ".
Then by Proposition 1, "  1=
P
si
"i = ". Hence industry e¢ ciency is less than
rm e¢ ciency. The e¢ ciency of the industrial organization is "IO = "=".
2. Consider an industry that produces a single good from labor capital.
Three rms each produce one unit of output. Firm 1 uses just one unit of
labor, rm 2 uses just one unit of capital, and rm 3 uses 1/3 units of both
commodities. Since rm 1 has labor only, the technologies of rms 2 and 3
(which employ capital) are of no use. There is no potential increase of its
output. The same conclusion holds for rm 2. Firm 3 could reallocate its
labor and capital to the technologies employed by rms 1 and 2, respectively,
but its output would go down from 1 to 2/3. Hence no rm has scope for an
increase in output. All potential outputs are equal to the observed outputs,
all rms are 100% e¢ cient. The industry, however, is not e¢ cient. If rms
1 and 2 would merge and adopt the technology of rm 3, the new rm would
be three times as big as rm 3, hence produce three units of output, which is
one more than they produce using their own technologies. Potential output is
four units (instead of three), so that the expansion factor is 4/3 and, therefore,
the industry e¢ ciency is 3/4 or only 75%. The e¢ ciency of the industrial
organization is 75/100 = 0.75 or 75%. The industry would do better if the two
specialized rms would merge.
3. It is straightforward to construct an example where the industry would
do better if a rm were broken up: Simply substitute diseconomies of scope for
the economies of scope in Example 2.
4. Add a fourth rm to Example 2 which has the same inputs as rm 3, but
only 1/2 a unit of output. Clearly, rm 4 could produce a full unit of output
(adopting the technology of rm 3). Its e¢ ciency is 50%. In the present
example, the outputs are 1, 1, 1, 0.5. The market shares are 2/7, 2/7, 2/7,
1/7. The rm e¢ ciencies are 100%, 100%, 100%, 50%. The harmonic mean is
1=
P






0:50 ) or 87.5% . For the industry potential
output is three for rms 1 and 2 jointly (see Example 2) and one for rms 3 and
4 each, hence ve in total (instead of three and a half), so that the expansion
factor is 5/3.5 and, therefore, the industry e¢ ciency is 3.5/5 or only 70%. The
e¢ ciency of the industrial organization is 70/87.5 =0.8 or 80%.
The upshot for performance analysis is the following.
Corollary 2. Industry e¢ ciency is the product of (market share weighted
harmonic) mean rm e¢ ciency and the e¢ ciency of the industrial organization.
Corollary 2 will enable us to rene the decomposition of productivity growth
in technical change and e¢ ciency change.
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4 Productivity growth
In the previous section I interrelated the e¢ ciency levels of rms with that of
the industry in a snapshot. Now time is introduced by subscripting inputs
and outputs, as well as the derived constructs, using the symbol t. Firm i
has input and output vectors xit and y
i





is derived, the potential output of rm i. Its e¢ ciency is indicated by "it, a







It is important to understand that e¢ ciency may change for reasons of internal,
rm organization and for reasons of external, industrial organization. If the
production possibilities of the industry remain constant, but rm i improves its
output/input ratio (or productivity), thus getting closer to the production possi-
bility frontier, the better internal organization yields positive e¢ ciency change.
In this case, its productivity growth equals e¢ ciency change, while technical
change is zero. If rm i has a constant output/input ratio, but the production
possibility frontier of the industry shifts out, the better external organization
implies negative e¢ ciency change for the rm. In this case e¢ ciency change
and technical change cancel out and the rm has zero productivity growth. In







I have dened e¢ ciency change, but not yet technical change. Technical
change manifests itself as a shift of the production possibility frontier. At each
point of time, the frontier is determined by the industrial organization (xt; yt).
The e¢ ciency of rm i is determined by program (1). Its input-output pair,
(xit; y
i
t), is benchmarked against (xt; yt). Formally, program (1) determines the
e¢ ciency of rm i as a function of (xit; y
i





t); (xt; yt)), where mapping e summarizes the e¢ ciency program.
Notice that the program that determines the e¢ ciency of the industry, (5), has
precisely the same structure as that for the rms, hence the same mapping e
governs the relationship between the data and industry e¢ ciency. The only
di¤erence is that it benchmarks the industry input-output pair, (xt; yt). Con-
sequently, program (5) may be written as "t = e((xt; yt); (xt; yt)), with the
same mapping e. Mapping e has two arguments, the input-output pair that
is benchmarked, (xit; y
i
t) in case of the rm, and the industry constellation that
determines the frontier, (xt; yt). Notice that the structure of program (1) or (5)
is independent of time, so that time does not enter the function as a separate
argument. Denote the two partial derivatives of the mapping by e1 and e2.5
By total di¤erentiation, the e¢ ciency change of rm i is:
5Both are row vectors, because either argument has a number of components: the number





































The measurement of technical change is subtle. If rm i stays put(xit; y
i
t) =
constantbut potential output increases, there must be technical progress. Now
an increase in potential output, 1="it, is equivalent to a decrease in e¢ ciency, "
i
t.
Hence a negative second partial derivative (which captures the external e¤ect)
indicates technical progress and, therefore, technical change is measured by:







t); (xt; yt)) (12)
Finally, productivity growth of rm i ought to be dened irrespective the















t); (xt; yt)) (13)
Here input and output changes are prized by the marginal products of the
rm. In other words, PGit is the Solow residual of rm i:














Proof. The proof is by duality analysis. Mapping es rst argument,
(xit; y
i
t), lists the bounds in program (1). Now the partial derivatives of the
objective value, 1="it, with respect to the bounds are the shadow prices, w
i
t
and  pit. The di¤erent signs reect the opposite signs of the inequalities in































t, by equation (3). Q.E.D.
Summarizing, e¢ ciency change is dened by (9), technical change by (12),
productivity growth by (13), and the former two sum to the latter by equation
(11), which conrms our intuitive equation (10).
Things look only slightly di¤erent at the level of the industry. Now in-
dustry input and output, (xIt ; y
I
t ), are benchmarked against the frontier. The
productivity growth of the industry is:
PGt = e1((xt; yt); (xt; yt))
d
dt
(xt; yt)=e((xt; yt); (xt; yt)) (14)
of the possibility of jumps, the derivatives must be generalized to signed measures. The partial
derivatives capture the shadow prices, as revealed by the ensueing analysis.
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This expression is basically a summation of the rm productivity growth
rates, (13), with the modication that private shadow prices have been replaced
by social values. This di¤erence constitutes precisely the aggregation bias un-
covered by ten Raa (2005). The same di¤erence between private and social
valuations causes a bias in the aggregation of technical change, (12), but here it
is a minor phenomenon, specic to the nonparametric approach. Consequently,
the productivity aggregation bias is basically equal to the e¢ ciency aggregation
bias, or, invoking Corollary 2, the industrial organization e¤ect. The next sec-
tion will explicate the role of industrial organization in the performance measure
of productivity.
5 Malmquist indices
In discrete time a fascinating thought construct is to benchmark a rm against
the industry at another period. One may hope that the e¢ ciency of a rm
benchmarked against the industry in the next period, e((xit; y
i
t); (xt+1; yt+1)),
is low. The basic idea of the Malmquist productivity index is to trace rm i
from period t to t+1 and to measure the change in e¢ ciency relative to a xed
benchmark. For example, benchmarking against the second period yields
e((xit+1; y
i
t+1); (xt+1; yt+1)) e((xit; yit); (xt+1; yt+1)). This di¤erence expres-
sion is a discrete time version of productivity growth expression (13). E¢ ciency
change contributes to the rst term and technical change to the second term.
The discrete time frame prompts two minor modications. First, Malmquist







.6 Second, since one could just as well benchmark against







, the geometric aver-
age of the two possibilities is taken. In short, the Malmquist productivity index

















Incidentally, it is straightforward to recover the decomposition in e¢ ciency
change and technical change (ten Raa and Shestalova, 2006). Simply rewrite

























The rst quotient in decomposition (16) measures the increase in e¢ ciency
from time t to time t+1. The remainder, the square root, contains two quotients
6At a rst order Taylor approximation this is equivalent to a change of variable, to the
exponential function. For example, a growth rate of 1% will yield an index of 1.01. It is
customary though to stick to the percentage format in reporting Malmquist indices.
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in which the rm is xed (at time t, respectively t+1), but the benchmark shifts;
this measures technical change.
Turning from rm i to the industry, benchmark industry input and output
against the frontier. Comparison with the rm index (15) shows that the
industry Malmquist productivity index becomes:
M t =
s
e((xt+1; yt+1); (xt; yt))
e((xt; yt); (xt; yt))

e((xt+1; yt+1); (xt+1; yt+1))
e((xt; yt); (xt+1; yt+1))
(17)
Proposition 3. The Malmquist productivity index aggregates the change























The rst quotient measures the change in the e¢ ciency of the industrial
organization. Firm e¢ ciencies are aggregated in the second quotient by the
market share weighted harmonic mean and market shares are evaluated at the
shadow prices of the industry e¢ ciency program (5). The square root measures
technical change.
Proof. Apply formula (16) to the industry and substitute, using Denition








t); (xt; yt)) and similar for
e((xt+1; yt+1); (xt; yt)). Q.E.D.
6 Application
Consider the Japanese banks (i = 1; :::; I = 136) over a ve year period (t =
1992; :::; 1996).7 There are three inputs (labor, capital, and funds from cus-
tomers) and two outputs (loans and other investments). Formally we have a
panel of inputs and outputs, (xit; y
i
t). For the four transitions between periods
Thanh Le Phuoc has computed the dynamic performance measure of produc-
tivity growth, and, applying Proposition 3, its decomposition in the industrial
organization e¤ect, rms e¢ ciency change and technical change. The results
are in Table 1.8
7Fukuyama and Weber (2002) kindly made available their data. The data were obtained
by extracting Nikkeis data tape of bank nancial statements. Six banks had missing data
and were excluded. These were Akita Akebono, Bank of Tokyo, Hanwa, Hyogo, Midori, and
Taiheiyo.
8When Malmquist indices and its components are properly reported as fractions of the
order 1, the product of the components equals total productivity growth. When reported
as percentages, the components sum to total factor productivity growth, up to a rst order
Taylor approximation. This and rounding errors explain why not all row gures add.
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Table 1.
The three contributions to the performance of the Japanese banking industry
Period Industrial Firms Technical Total
Organization E¢ ciency Change Productivity
1992-1993 0.07% -0.51% 0.52% 0.08%
1993-1994 0.57% 0.31% -0.58% 0.29%
1994-1995 -0.45% 0.35% 1.28% 1.18%
1995-1996 0.23% 0.70% 2.19% 3.15%
Total, annualized 0.11% 0.21% 0.85% 1.17%
The results permit a diagnosis of the Japanese banking industry. In the
mid 1990s Japanese banking showed a solid performance of 1.17% productivity
growth per year, much due to a nal sprint. The bulk, in fact a share of 73%,
was due to technical change, such as advancements in electronic banking. The
second biggest chunk, in fact a share of 18%, was due to e¢ ciency change at the
bank level, such as the spread of ATMs. Last and least, industrial reorgani-
zation accounts for 9% of the Japanese banking productivity growth. Various
explanations can be advanced to understand these di¤erent contributions, such
as R&D, competitive pressure, and changes in bankruptcy procedures. Many
observers feel that there is scope for a bigger role of the industrial reorganization
of Japanese banking. True or not, the rst task seems to be the measurement
of its share in productivity growth. At least that can now be ticked o¤ the
research agenda.
7 Conclusion
An industry may perform better, in the sense of productivity growth, by techni-
cal progress or by e¢ ciency change. Both sources of growth have been decom-
posed to the rms of an industry, but the aggregation is imperfect. An industry
may improve its performance by industrial reorganization as well. The ine¢ -
ciency of an industrial organization mirrors the bias in the aggregation of the
e¢ ciencies of the rms. It may be reduced by reallocation, such as picking
winners. The industrial organization e¤ect is measured by the change in the
ratio of the industry e¢ ciency to the market share weighted harmonic mean
of the rm e¢ ciencies. All measures, including the e¢ ciency of an industrial
organization, can be calculated using only input and output data of the rms.
11
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